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ECKLES V. CONSOLIDATED RAIL CORP.:
RECONCILING THE ADA WITH COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING AGREEMENTS: IS THIS THE
CORRECT APPROACH?
Condon A. McGlothlen* and Gary N. Savine**
INTRODUCTION
The Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA" or "the Act") was
enacted on July 26, 1990, with Title I of the Act taking effect on July
26, 1992.1 Among the duties imposed on employers and unions by
Title I is the duty to provide "reasonable accommodation" to qualified
individuals with a disability.2 The term "reasonable accommodation"
is statutorily defined to include:
(a) making existing facilities used by employees readily accessible
to and useable by individuals with disabilities; and
(b) job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, reas-
signment to a vacant position, acquisition or modification of equip-
ment or devices, appropriate adjustment or modifications of
examinations, training materials or policies, the provision of quali-
fied readers or interpreters, and other similar accommodations for
individuals with disabilities.3
Since the ADA's enactment, debate has persisted over whether the
Act may require an employer to take action contrary to the terms of a
collective bargaining agreement in order to provide reasonable ac-
commodation.4 The statute does not clearly answer this question.
* Partner, Seyfarth, Shaw, Fairweather & Geraldson, Chicago, Illinois; B.A., University of
Kentucky (1984); J.D., University of Wisconsin-Madison (1987).
This Article is based on a presentation given by Condon McGlothlen on January 31, 1997, at
DePaul Law Review's Symposium entitled Individual Rights and Reasonable Accommodations
Under the Americans with Disabilities Act.
** Associate, Seyfarth, Shaw, Fairweather & Geraldson, Chicago, Illinois; B.A., James
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1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994). Title I contains the ADA employment provisions. Title
II covers state and local governments. Title II contains public accommodation provisions. Title
IV contains miscellaneous provisions. 'Ibis Article focuses on Title I.
2. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A).
3. Id. § 12111(9).
4. See, e.g., Mary K. O'Melveny, The Americans with Disabilities Act and Collective Bargain-
ing Agreements: Reasonable Accommodation or Irreconcilable Conflicts?, 82 Ky. L.J. 219 (1993-
94); Eric H.J. Stahlhut, Playing the Trump Card: May an Employer Refuse To Reasonably Ac-
commodate under the ADA by Claiming a Collective Bargaining Obligation?, 9 LAB. LAW. 71
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Section 12112(b)(2) of the Act simply states that it is unlawful to "par-
ticipat[e] in a contractual or other arrangement or relationship that
has the effect of subjecting a[n] ... applicant or employee with a disa-
bility to... discrimination." 5 While this provision obviously prohibits
an employer and union from entering into a collective bargaining
agreement which, for instance, restricts the hiring of persons with
AIDS or requires that individuals with mental disorders be paid less
than other workers, it does not answer the question of whether an
employer or union may be required to abridge the collectively bar-
gained seniority rights of other workers in order to accommodate per-
sons with disabilities.
The resultant uncertainty is troublesome for both unions and em-
ployers. Unions may fear that employers will use their duty to accom-
modate under the ADA in order to circumvent their obligations under
a collective bargaining agreement. Employers, on the other hand,
may worry that if they rely on collective bargaining agreement provi-
sions as a defense to an employee's request for reasonable accommo-
dations, they could subject themselves to liability under the ADA. In
other words, the ADA can put both unions and employers in a diffi-
cult position because the duty to accommodate sometimes implicates
not only the rights of persons with disabilities, but also the balance
between those rights and the rights of other bargaining unit employ-
ees who are collectively represented by a union.
This Article focuses on the Seventh Circuit's attempt in Eckles v.
Consolidated Rail Corp.6 to reconcile the tension between the ADA
and collective bargaining agreements negotiated pursuant to the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act.7 Part I examines how courts approached
the issue prior to Eckles. Part II discusses the holding in Eckles and
how the Seventh Circuit reached its conclusion. Finally, Part III criti-
ques the Seventh Circuit's analysis in Eckles and discusses issues
raised by the decision.
I. THE APPROACH TAKEN BY OTHER CIRCUITS
Prior to Eckles, few courts had spoken directly on whether an em-
ployer's duty to provide a "reasonable accommodation" under the
ADA could trump the collectively bargained seniority rights of other
(1993); Joanne Jocha Ervin, Reasonable Accommodation and the Collective Bargaining Agree-
ment Under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 1991 DET. C.L. L. REV. 925.
5. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(2).
6. 94 F.3d 1041 (7th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 65 U.S.L.W. 3647 (U.S. Mar. 21, 1997) (No. 96-
7525).
7. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1994).
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workers. Most courts which had addressed the general topic of indi-
vidual versus collective rights had done so in the nonunion setting or
in dictum, and typically in a superficial, conclusory manner. Thus,
when the Seventh Circuit was squarely presented with the issue in the
collective bargaining context of Eckles, case law from other circuits
provided minimal guidance.
The Eighth Circuit, for instance, addressed the tension between the
ADA and collectively bargained rights in two cases.8 In neither case
was the court's analysis in this regard essential to its holding. In Woo-
ten v. Farmland Foods,9 the court declared that an employer is not
required to make accommodations that would violate the rights of
other employees. 10 More specifically, the court stated that the em-
ployer, Farmland Foods, did not have to breach the collective bargain-
ing agreement or fire other employees in order to transfer the plaintiff
to a light-duty position compatible with his doctor-prescribed work
restrictions." The court, however, did not explain why it read the
duty to accommodate under the ADA to be limited by the rights of
other employees. Furthermore, it reached the "accommodation" is-
sue after having concluded that the plaintiff was not "disabled" within
the meaning of the ADA.12 Consequently, the court's discussion of
what is required of an employer in terms of reasonable accommoda-
tion was not essential to its holding because the employer had no duty
to accommodate the nondisabled plaintiff.13
Similarly, in Benson v. Northwest Airlines, Inc. ,4 the Eighth Circuit
stated that the employer was not required to assign the plaintiff to a
specific position where the assignment would have violated the collec-
tively bargained seniority rights of more senior workers. 15 Moreover,
the court stated that if a "vacant" position existed for which the plain-
tiff was qualified, the plaintiff's right to transfer to that position as a
reasonable accommodation would still be subject to collective bar-
8. See Benson v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 62 F.3d 1108 (8th Cir. 1995); Wooten v. Farmland
Foods, 58 F.3d 382 (8th Cir. 1995).
9. 58 F.3d 382 (8th Cir. 1995).
10. Id. at 386.
11. Id. The plaintiff in Wooten, a ham boner, alleged that bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome
restricted him to light-duty work involving no meat products and no work in a cold environment.
Id. at 384. His employer maintained that it could not accommodate him with light-duty work
compatible with his physical restrictions because all of its light-duty positions were filled and it
would not fire other employees to make light-duty work available to him. Id.
12. Id. at 386.
13. Id. at 385-86.
14. 62 F.3d 1108 (8th Cir. 1995).
15. Id. at 1114.
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gaining agreement limitations. 16 Once again, however, the court's ac-
commodation discussion was cursory dictum because the main issue
presented was the factual question of whether a vacant position ex-
isted to which the employer could have transferred the plaintiff. 17
Finding a genuine issue of fact in this regard, the Eighth Circuit re-
manded the case to the district court.' 8
The Fifth Circuit explored the tension between individual and col-
lective rights in two cases arising in the nonunion context. 19 In
Daugherty v. City of El Paso,20 the court rejected the plaintiff's argu-
ment that his disability entitled him to transfer to a specific position in
contravention of a city charter which required that transfer priority be
given to full-time employees. 21 In holding that the city did not violate
the ADA by denying the transfer, the court made the following note-
worthy comment:
[W]e do not read the ADA as requiring affirmative action in favor
of individuals with disabilities, in the sense of requiring that dis-
abled persons be given priority in hiring or reassignment over those
who are not disabled. It prohibits employment discrimination
against qualified individuals with disabilities, no more and no less.22
Thus, the court expressly recognized, even in the nonunion setting,
that the rights of other workers may sometimes circumscribe the duty
under the ADA to provide reasonable accommodation.
Similarly, in Turco v. Hoechst Celanese Corp. ,23 a case involving
facts similar to those in Daugherty, the Fifth Circuit again recognized
the rights of other nonunion workers in defining the scope of an em-
ployer's duty to reasonably accommodate a plaintiff's disability.24
Specifically, the court held that the employer was not required to
change the plaintiff's schedule from a rotating shift to a regular day
16. Id. The plaintiff in Benson, a mechanic, had been diagnosed with a rare neurological dis-
order that restricted his ability to perform tasks involving extensive and repetitive use of his left
arm and shoulder. Id. at 1110-11. The plaintiff attempted to transfer into another position that
fit his physical abilities but was refused transfer and was subsequently terminated. Id. The
court's opinion does not make clear whether the transfer was prohibited by a contract provision
which prohibited bumping of more senior workers or by a more general seniority provision.
17. Id. at 1114-15.
18. Id. at 1115.
19. See Daugherty v. City of El Paso, 56 F.3d 695 (5th Cir. 1995); Turco v. Hoechst Celanese
Corp., 101 F.3d 1090 (5th Cir. 1996) (per curiam).
20. 56 F.3d 695 (5th Cir. 1995).
21. Id. at 699-700. The plaintiff in Daugherty was a public bus driver who suffered from an
insulin-dependent diabetic condition. Id. at 696. Because the Department of Transportation
regulations prohibited diabetics from operating buses, the City relieved him of his duties. Id.
22. Id. at 700.
23. 101 F.3d 1090 (5th Cir. 1996) (per curiam).
24. Id. at 1094.
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shift because to do so would place a heavier burden on other employ-
ees occupying similar positions.25 Moreover, in refusing to require the
employer to accommodate the plaintiff by creating a light-duty posi-
tion compatible with his work restrictions, the court stated: "The law
does not require affirmative action in favor of individuals with disabil-
ities. It merely prohibits employment discrimination against qualified
individuals with disabilities, no more and no less."'26
Prior to Eckles, only the Tenth Circuit had squarely held that the
duty to provide reasonable accommodation under the ADA does not
trump the collectively bargained seniority rights of other workers. In
Milton v. Scrivner, Inc.,27 the plaintiffs suffered from various on-the-
job injuries which prevented them from meeting the employer's new
production standards. 28 They argued that the employer was required
to accommodate them with reduced production standards, lighter
work loads, or the opportunity to bid on other jobs within the com-
pany.29 The court rejected the plaintiffs' arguments, specifically find-
ing that the applicable collective bargaining agreement precluded the
plaintiffs from transferring to any other job because they lacked the
requisite seniority.30 Unfortunately, the Tenth Circuit did not make
clear why it read the accommodation duty to be limited by the collec-
tively bargained seniority rights of others.
II. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT'S APPROACH-ECKLES V.
CONSOLIDATED RAIL CORP.
The facts in Eckles bear detailing. Terry Eckles began working for
the Consolidated Rail Corporation ("Conrail") in 1992 as a yardmas-
ter at its rail yard in Avon, Indiana.31 He was covered by a collective
bargaining agreement between Conrail and the United Transportation
Union ("Union"). 32 Eckles' "position required him to work varying
shifts, including the third shift (11:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m.), and to work in
a tower office that could be accessed only by climbing two to three
25. Id. The plaintiff in Turco was a chemical process operator who suffered from an insulin-
dependent diabetic condition. Id. at 1091. Like the plaintiff in Daugherty, Tbrco was terminated
because his condition made it difficult for him to concentrate on his work, which posed a danger
to both the plaintiff and his co-workers. Id. at 1092.
26. Id. at 1094 (quoting Daugherty, 56 F.3d at 700).
27. 53 F.3d 1118 (10th Cir. 1995).
28. Id. at 1120.
29. Id. at 1124.
30. Id. at 1124-25.
31. Eckles v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 94 F.3d 1041, 1043 (7th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 65
U.S.L.W. 3647 (U.S. Mar. 21, 1997) (No. 96-7525).
32. Id.
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flights of open, outdoor, metal stairs. ' 33 In May 1992, after having
experienced a seizure, Eckles was diagnosed with epilepsy.34 His doc-
tor released him to return to work with the following restrictions: (1)
"he should not work at heights because of the possibility of having a
seizure and falling"; and (2) "he should not work the night shift be-
cause of the need for a regular sleep schedule. ' 35
Eckles requested that Conrail invoke Rule 2-H-1 of the collective
bargaining agreement and transfer him to a position that fit his work
restrictions. 36 Rule 2-H-1 stated that Conrail and the Union could
enter into a written agreement which would accommodate the job lim-
itations of a disabled employee by allowing that employee to displace
(or "bump") a more senior employee. 37 In July 1992, Conrail and the
Union agreed that Eckles could take another employee's second shift
position at Hawthorne Yard in Indianapolis, where the office was lo-
cated on the ground level.38 The displaced employee was more senior
than Eckles by more than thirty slots. 39 The Union later rescinded its
agreement under Rule 2-H-i, however, and Eckles was bumped from
the Hawthorne position by a more senior employee in November.40
Eckles thereafter went on involuntary sick leave until 1993.41 When
he returned, the Union refused to grant him special placement under




36. Id. at 1044.
37. Id. Rule 2-H-1 specifically provided in relevant part:
(a) Subject to agreement, in writing, between the Manager-Labor Relations and Divi-
sion Chairman, a disabled employee covered by this Agreement may be placed ... in a
position occupied by another employee, without regard to seniority, provided that such
an employee is capable of performing the duties required.
(c) A position in which a disabled employee has been placed by agreement under para-
graph (a) hereof shall not be subject to the seniority ... provisions of this Agreement,
except that a disabled employee so assigned may be displaced by a senior qualified
employee if there is no other position covered by this Agreement to which such senior
employee can exercise seniority.
Id. at 1044 n.2.
38. Id. at 1044.
39. Id. Although not explicitly stated, it appears that rail yard employees at Avon and Indian-
apolis were covered by the same collective bargaining agreement. Id. at 1043-44. A single sen-
iority roster covered yardmasters at both locations. Id.
40. Id. at 1044.
41. Id.
42. Id. Prior to Eckles' sick leave, Conrail had asked the Union to agree to a special place-
ment at Hawthorne in order to accommodate Eckles' condition. Id. It is unclear, however,
whether Conrail again asked the Union to consent to this placement after Eckles had returned to
work.
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at Hawthorne.43 However, because he held the position due to his
seniority and not under Rule 2-H-i, he was not protected against be-
ing bumped by a more senior employee.44
Eckles subsequently sued both Conrail and the Union under the
ADA, claiming that they had failed to reasonably accommodate his
disability by not giving him a Hawthorne yardmaster position.4 5 The
district court granted summary judgment for both defendants, reason-
ing that the duty to accommodate did not require the defendants to
violate the bona fide seniority rights of other employees under the
applicable collective bargaining agreement. 46 Eckles appealed the dis-
trict court's ruling to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit.
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit described the issue as whether "rea-
sonable accommodation" requires "that a disabled individual be given
special job placement and job protection (from bumping) in violation
of a bona fide seniority system" under a collective bargaining agree-
ment.47 "This poses a conflict not so much between the rights of the
disabled individual and his employer and union," the court wrote,
"but between the rights of the disabled individual and those of his co-
workers."48
The court held that the ADA cannot be construed to require an
employer to accommodate a disabled employee by compromising the
collectively bargained seniority rights of other workers.49 The court
reached this conclusion by analyzing the statutory definition of "rea-
sonable accommodation," the ADA's legislative history, and case law
under both Title VII and the Rehabilitation Act.50
The court first emphasized that the ADA expressly defines "reason-





47. Id. at 1045-46. The court stressed the existence of a bona fide seniority system-"one that
was created for legitimate purposes, rather than for the purpose of discrimination." Id. at 1046
n.7.
48. Id. at 1046.
49. Id. at 1051. It should be noted that the court expressly limited its holding to contractual
seniority rights and stated that the holding ought not to be construed as a "general finding that
all provisions found in collective bargaining agreements are immune from limitation by the duty
under the ADA to reasonably accommodate." Id. at 1052.
50. Id. at 1047-51; see Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-797b (1994); Civil Rights Act of
1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994); 29 C.F.R. § 1613.704 (Rehabilitation Act regulations addressing
"reasonable accommodation").
1997] 1049
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tion. ' '51 This language, the court reasoned, foreclosed Eckles'
argument that reasonable accommodation requires the bumping of
more senior employees. 52 The court stated:
[U]nder a seniority system like that in place at Conrail, few posi-
tions are ever truly "vacant," in the sense of being unfilled. Rather,
positions held by less senior employees are open to be bid upon and
acquired by more senior employees, provided the bidding employee
can meet the qualifications for the desired job. Within such a
framework a "vacant position" would essentially be one that an em-
ployee could acquire with his seniority and for which he could meet
the job requirements. 53
Therefore, Eckles' requested accommodation would entail more than
simply a "reassignment to a vacant position. 54
The court later noted that the legislative history of the ADA
strongly supports the position that a "reasonable accommodation"
does not require a reassignment which conflicts with the collectively
bargained seniority rights of other workers. 55 The court specifically
pointed to the reports of the House and Senate Committees princi-
pally responsible for crafting the ADA.56 Both committee reports em-
phasize that reassignment need only be to a vacant position and that
"'bumping' another employee out of a position to create a vacancy is
not required. '57 Moreover, the court noted, the committee reports
state that reassignment would not be appropriate where the disabled
employee is not qualified for the position sought because he does not
meet either the established physical criteria or the required seniority
minimum.5 8 Consequently, the court concluded that reasonable ac-
51. Eckles, 94 F.3d at 1047 (emphasis added); see Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 12111(9) (1994).




56. Id. at 1047-50; see H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 63 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 345; S. REP. No. 101-116, at 32 (1989).
57. Eckles, 94 F.3d at 1049 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 63 and S. REP. No. 101-
116, at 32).
58. Id. at 1050. Notably, however, neither committee report states unequivocally that a dis-
abled employee's lack of seniority would bar reassignment as an accommodation. More specifi-
cally, both reports provide in relevant part:
The collective bargaining agreement could be relevant ... in determining whether a
given accommodation is reasonable. For example, if a collective bargaining agreement
reserves certain jobs for employees with a given amount of seniority, it may be consid-
ered as a factor in determining whether it is a reasonable accommodation to assign an
employee with a disability without seniority to the job.
H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 63; S. REP. No. 101-116, at 32 (emphasis added).
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commodation does not require the violation of collectively bargained
seniority rights.59
The court also noted that case law interpreting the Rehabilitation
Act and Title VII conflicted with Eckles' interpretation of "reasonable
accommodation. ' 60 As used in the ADA "reasonable accommoda-
tion" was borrowed from regulations issued by the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") under the Rehabilitation
Act.61 Courts, however, have unanimously rejected the contention
that "'reasonable accommodation' under the Rehabilitation Act re-
quires reassignment of a disabled employee in violation of a bona fide
seniority system. '62 The Seventh Circuit noted, "a virtual per se rule
has emerged that such reassignment is not required under the Reha-
bilitation Act's duty to reasonably accommodate. '63 As the court saw
it, Congress drafted the ADA against a uniform backdrop of Rehabili-
tation Act holdings that "reasonable accommodation" does not re-
quire compromising the seniority rights of other employees. 64
The court further noted that in the Title VII context, the term "rea-
sonable accommodation" has been interpreted the same way. 65 Title
VII requires an employer to "'reasonably accommodate' the religious
observances and practices of its employees, up to the point of 'undue
hardship on the conduct of the employer's business.'" 66 The Eckles
court noted that in Trans World Airlines v. Hardison,67 the U.S.
Supreme Court rejected the contention that this duty requires an em-
ployer to violate a valid seniority system, citing the importance of col-
lective bargaining and the protected status of employee seniority
rights under the federal labor laws.68 "Without a clear and express
indication from Congress," the Supreme Court wrote, "we cannot
agree ... that an agreed-upon seniority system must give way when
necessary to accommodate religious observances. '69 The Seventh Cir-
59. Eckles, 94 F.3d at 1050-52.
60. Id. at 1047-48.
61. Id. at 1047; see 29 C.F.R. § 1613.704 (1997).
62. Eckles, 94 F.3d at 1047.
63. Id. In support, the court cited to Tyler v. Runyon, 70 F.3d 458, 468 (7th Cir. 1995); Mason
v. Frank, 32 F.3d 315, 319-20 (8th Cir. 1994); Shea v. Tisch, 870 F.2d 786, 789-90 (1st Cir. 1989)
(per curiam); Carter v. Tisch, 822 F.2d 465, 467-69 (4th Cir. 1987); Jasany v. United States Postal
Service, 755 F.2d 1244, 1251-52 (6th Cir. 1985); and Daubert v. United States Postal Service, 733
F.2d 1367, 1370 (10th Cir. 1984). Eckles, 94 F.3d at 1047-48.
64. Eckles, 94 F.3d at 1048.
65. Id.
66. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (1994)).
67. 432 U.S. 63, 79 (1977).
68. Eckles, 94 F.3d at 1048 (quoting Hardison, 432 U.S. at 79).
69. Id. (quoting Hardison, 432 U.S. at 79). Furthermore, the Supreme Court noted: "Collec-
tive bargaining, aimed at effecting workable and enforceable agreements between management
19971 1051
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cuit reasoned in Eckles that, because the language in the ADA simi-
larly fails to evidence such clear congressional intent, the Act cannot
be interpreted as requiring accommodations which would infringe
upon other employees' seniority rights.70
Finally, the Seventh Circuit noted that Rule 2-H-1 of Conrail's col-
lective bargaining agreement did not affect reasonable accommoda-
tion requirements. 71 The court rejected the argument that the duty to
reasonably accommodate imposes on employers and unions a duty to
negotiate a "variance" from collectively bargained seniority rules
when the only effective accommodation would violate those rules.72
III. Is ECKLES THE CORRECT APPROACH? 7 3
The Seventh Circuit's resolution of the conflict between an em-
ployer's duty to reasonably accommodate under the ADA and the
collectively bargained rights of other workers, although correct in
principle, is analytically flawed in some significant respects. The court
correctly refused to read the ADA as requiring generally employers to
accommodate disabled employees by compromising the collectively
bargained seniority rights of other workers. The court appears to
have erred, however, by not recognizing that Rule 2-H-1 in the collec-
tive bargaining agreement between Conrail and the Union modified
the seniority rights of bargaining unit employees. Moreover, the
court's holding is based in part on the religious accommodation analy-
sis under Title VII-an approach rejected by Congress in enacting the
ADA.74
and labor, lies at the core of our national labor policy, and seniority provisions are universally
included in these contracts." Id. (quoting Hardison, 432 U.S. at 79).
70. Id.
71. Id. at 1050. As noted above, Rule 2-H-1 provided that upon written agreement by Conrail
and the Union, a disabled employee may be allowed to bump a more senior employee to accom-
modate the disabled employee's work restrictions. See supra note 37 (quoting Rule 2-H-1 in
pertinent part).
72. Eckles, 94 F.3d at 1051 n.18.
73. Since the Seventh Circuit decided Eckles, at least three district courts have followed the
Seventh Circuit's lead and held that the duty to reasonably accommodate under the ADA does
not require an employer to compromise the collectively bargained rights of other employees.
See, e.g., Daigre v. Jefferson Parish Sch. Bd., No. Civ. A96-0856, 1997 WL 16621 (E.D. La. Jan.
16, 1997) (holding that the ADA did not require the employer to grant a job transfer in violation
of the collectively bargained, bona fide transfer rights of more senior employees); Taylor v. Food
World, Inc., 946 F. Supp. 937 (N.D. Ala. 1996) (ruling that the employer was not required to
provide a job transfer contrary to the competitive bidding provisions of the collective bargaining
agreement); Collins v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 942 F. Supp. 449 (W.D. Mo. 1996) (holding that
the ADA did not require the employer to assign the plaintiff to a modified work program where
such assignment would violate the collective bargaining agreement provision limiting program
participation to temporarily disabled employees).
74. See infra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
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Before critiquing Eckles, however, it should be noted that the Sev-
enth Circuit's decision is by far the most thorough judicial discussion
of the interplay between the ADA and collectively bargained seniority
systems. Moreover, the court's holding that collectively bargained
seniority rights cannot be sacrificed for the sake of reasonable accom-
modation is consistent with the ADA's underlying purpose. As noted
by the Fifth Circuit in Daugherty and Turco, the ADA does not re-
quire "affirmative action," in the sense that disabled persons have pri-
ority over nondisabled persons in hiring, reassignment, or other terms
and conditions of employment. 75 Rather, the Act requires that dis-
abled employees be accommodated so as to put them on an equal
footing with their nondisabled co-workers. For an employer's accom-
modation duty to take precedence over the seniority rights of nondis-
abled employees would be to give disabled employees an advantage
over nondisabled employees in competition for job assignments, pro-
motions, insulation from layoffs, etcetera. Although Eckles does not
discuss this equal opportunity/no affirmative action point, the point is
implicit in Eckles' well-founded concern for the seniority rights of
nondisabled co-workers.
With regard to such rights, however, the court's analysis effectively
ignores Rule 2-H-i, which appears on its face to have modified the
seniority rights of all bargaining unit employees. As previously noted,
Rule 2-H-1 allowed Conrail and the Union to agree to assign a dis-
abled employee to a position occupied by another employee, without
regard to seniority, in order to provide reasonable accommodation. 76
Noting that the rule permits (rather than requires) the company and
union to agree to such reassignments, the court declined to read this
provision as requiring a non-seniority-based assignment. This treat-
ment of Rule 2-H-1 is analytically flawed. A seniority system is a
creature of contract: the rights bestowed by a labor contract are only
as broad as the contract provides. By expressly authorizing Conrail
and the Union to accommodate disabled persons by assigning them to
positions held by more senior employees, Rule 2-H-1 in effect limited
the seniority rights of all employees. Put another way, Rule 2-H-1
made all employees' seniority rights contingent on Conrail's and the
Union's right (as parties to the labor contract) to agree to a non-sen-
iority-based assignment as a reasonable accommodation.
75. Daugherty v. City of El Paso, 56 F.3d 695, 700 (5th Cir. 1995); Turco v. Hoechst Celanese
Corp., 101 F.3d 1090, 1094 (5th Cir. 1996); see also supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text
(discussing the holding in Turco); supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text (discussing the hold-
ing in Daugherty).
76. See supra note 37 and accompanying text (quoting relevant parts of Rule 2-H-i).
1997] 1053
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The court's reasoning in Eckles appears further flawed to the extent
it relies on a religious accommodation analysis under Title VII as a
guidepost for deciding what is a "reasonable accommodation" or an
"undue hardship" under the ADA. In crafting the ADA, Congress
plainly rejected Title VII's "more than a de minimis cost" standard for
defining undue hardship-the standard endorsed by the Supreme
Court in Trans World Airlines v. Hardison.77 Yet the Seventh Circuit
cites Hardison as if it were at least persuasive in construing the
ADA.7 8 The court's analysis in this regard is a surprising deviation
from congressional intent.
Lastly, the court in Eckles failed to indicate whether its holding ap-
plies equally in the nonunion context.79 Many nonunion employers
follow seniority rules in filling vacancies and determining which em-
ployees to lay off. The Seventh Circuit's failure to address whether
seniority rights in the nonunion setting trump the duty to accommo-
date leaves many of the nation's employers wondering what is meant
by "reasonable accommodation."
CONCLUSION
In sum, despite its thorough discussion of collectively bargained
seniority rights and the duty to accommodate, the Seventh Circuit in
Eckles failed to resolve the tension between individual and collective
rights under the ADA once and for all. Even so, Eckles clearly signals
to employers and unions that they may reject proposed accommoda-
tions which would abridge the collectively bargained seniority rights
of nondisabled employees. Indeed, Eckles signals that this is the case
notwithstanding labor contract language authorizing the parties to
agree to accommodations without regard to seniority. Whether Eck-
les' analysis is correct in this latter regard is academic, at least in the
Seventh Circuit, for Eckles is the law. What is still unclear in the Sev-
enth Circuit after Eckles is the extent to which nonunion employers
may refuse proposed accommodations which would contravene sen-
iority-based employment systems. If such a system is "bona fide," that
is, not adopted for a discriminatory purpose, and if it is consistently
applied, then it follows as a matter of logic that accommodations vio-
77. H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 68 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 345; S. REP.
No. 101-116, at 36 (1989); see Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 65 (1977).
78. Eckles v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 94 F.3d 1041, 1048-49 (7th Cir. 1996), cert denied, 65
U.S.L.W. 3647 (U.S. Mar. 21, 1997) (No. 96-7525).
79. Such failure is understandable; courts should only rule on the questions presented. Still,
some guidance regarding the interplay between nonunion seniority systems and the ADA would
have been helpful for nonunion employers.
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lating seniority are not "reasonable" and, therefore, not required.
Whether this follows from Eckles as a matter of law, however, remains
to be seen.

